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ABSTRACT 
We consider the following question: does market failure justify redistribution? We 
argue that the general answer to this question is no, in the sense that policies for 
correcting market failures do not aim at producing a "desirable" income distribution. 
This follows from the fact that, by construction, market failure is a deviation from 
"efficiency" that does not involve any notion of a desirable distribution of welfare (or 
income). However, there are special cases where a "corrective measure" involving 
redistribution can offset a market failure, so this can provide a form of efficiency-
based justification for redistribution. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In this text, we consider the following question: does market failure justify redistribution? 
Our short answer to this question is no. The argument that leads to this answer can be 
summarized as follows.   
 
We take for granted that market failure as well as measures that aim at correcting such 
failures can have an impact on income inequality.  After recalling the basic distinction 
between positive and normative economics, we emphasize that normative economics 
involves two different styles of analysis: (1) "distribution-free" normative economics, which 
is based on separating aggregate wealth creation (efficiency) from distribution (equity) and 
focuses on the analysis of efficiency; (2) "distribution-sensitive" normative economics, 
where the levels of welfare (utilities) of different individuals are compared and weighted, for 
example through social welfare functions. "Distribution-free" normative economics avoids 
controversial choices on weighing different economic agents, but remains "incomplete". 
 
Efficiency analysis provides a partial ranking of economic outcomes, which allows one to 
eliminate certain outcomes (or policies) as inadmissible. Such procedures are quite common 
and useful in decision theory, because they can lead to substantial reductions of the set of 
possible solutions, though usually not to a unique one (which may require relatively 
controversial criteria). 
 
Market failure is a situation where an (idealized) market equilibrium model appears to 
generate inefficiencies, so the welfare of some economic agents can be improved without 
reducing the welfare of others. The notion of market failure is linked in a fundamental way 
to the distinction between efficiency and equity issues. By construction, market failure does 
not involve any notion of a desirable distribution of welfare (or income). 
    In view of the above distinctions, it is possible to distinguish efficiency-enhancing policies 
and redistribution policies. Given redistribution policies (which may take the form of a 
comprehensive income security scheme, a negative income tax, etc.), equity issues can be 
treated through such policies. 
 
We conclude that market failure does not justify redistribution, in the sense that policies for 
correcting market failures do not aim at producing a "desirable" income distribution. 
However, the "neutrality" of efficiency analysis does not mean that distribution (equity, 
inequality) or other ethical considerations are deemed to be unimportant for economic 
policy. 
 
As a qualification to the efficiency/equity dichotomy, we also point out that measures aimed 
at "correcting" market failures (such as taxes and subsidies) typically involve some 
redistribution, hence providing a form of "justification" for redistribution. For example, 
redistribution may be viewed as a way of increasing "social consensus", which could 
alleviate violence in society and foster cooperation. However, when they are viewed in the 
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broader context of "distribution-sensitive" normative economics, such distributive effects can 
be mediated and cancelled by redistribution policies. 
 
Below, we elaborate the above arguments. We also discuss the role of "distribution-
sensitive" normative economics, as well as limitations and problems associated with 
"distribution-free" and "distribution-sensitive" normative economics. 
 
 
2. POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE ECONOMICS 
 
To understand the relation between market failure and redistribution, it is important to 
remember some basic distinctions: between positive and normative economics, as well as 
between different forms of normative economics. 
 
Positive economics aims at describing, explaining and predicting "economic phenomena", 
such as the prices and quantities of goods and services sold in various markets, income, 
wealth, etc. In the view of many economists, positive economics makes economics a 
scientific discipline. In particular, the latter consists of two main types of activities: abstract 
theory construction, and empirical analysis. Abstract economic theory usually takes the form 
of models formulated in a mathematical language, where assumptions are explicitly specified 
and consequences are derived in a formal way. Coherence and the search for widely 
applicable assumptions play a major role in economic theory. Empirical analysis involves 
both the search for statistical regularities and the estimation and testing of economic models 
derived from economic theory (for example, through the use of econometric methods). The 
interaction between economic theory and empirical data is a central feature of modern 
economics. We think it is fair to say that the majority of research in economics involves 
empirical analysis and the assessment of theory with data. 
 
Normative economics aims at providing instruments for comparing economic outcomes 
(such as policy outcomes) in a way that can be useful to decision making. This requires the 
expression of tastes and value judgments. For this reason, it is not usually viewed as part of 
economics as a science. However, normative economics provides a framework for a highly 
rational form of decision making and may require elaborate calculations. The possibility of 
using normative economics for policy analysis certainly constitutes one of the main reasons 
for the influence and the social importance of economics as a discipline. 
 
Despite this basic difference, there is a close relationship between positive and normative 
economics, first through the dependence of normative economics on the findings of positive 
economics, but also through its general outlook on rational decision making. A basic claim 
of microeconomic theory -- the fundamental field of positive economics -- is that human 
behavior can be explained by preferences which provide a partial ordering of alternative 
possible choices (such as good baskets), without the need to introduce "cardinal" measures of 
utility. In particular, some choices may be equivalent, so they cannot be ranked in a strict 
sense: classes of equivalent choices constitute "indifference curves". 
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The fact that preferences do not yield a complete ordering of possible choices does not 
preclude them from playing a central role in decision modeling: once a reasonably well-
behaved constraint is added, such as a budget constraint or a concave production possibility 
frontier (which define "feasible" choices), a much reduced (typically unique) "optimal 
choice" can be derived. In such problems, a feasible choice to which another choice is 
strictly preferable can be deemed "non-admissible". Indeed, this situation is a general feature 
of "rational decision making".1 The problem of hypothesis testing constitutes another 
classical example where no unique ranking between alternative decision rules is available, 
because different types of risk trade off with each other (the type I and II error risks); this 
situation has led to the Neyman-Pearson approach to hypothesis testing [for discussion, see 
Lehmann (1986) and Dufour (2000, 2003)]. 
 
On the other hand, ordinal utility makes interpersonal comparisons difficult and largely 
arbitrary. For this reason, economists remain reluctant to make interpersonal comparisons 
[Kaldor (1939), Hicks (1939)]. Against this background, assessing economic outcomes 
typically requires taking into account the welfare of many individuals who may be 
differently affected by an economic situation (or by a policy). Since interpersonal 
comparisons are difficult, this has led to a dual approach to normative economics, which can 
be called distribution-free normative economics and distribution-sensitive normative 
economics. 
 
3. DISTRIBUTION-FREE NORMATIVE ECONOMICS AND MARKET FAILURE 
 
Distribution-free normative economics is based on the following ideas. This discussion 
entails our basic answer to the question asked at the beginning. 
 
First, resource allocations are ranked following the Pareto criterion. According to this 
criterion, a resource allocation is inefficient if it is possible to improve the welfare of at least 
some individuals while not lowering the welfare of the others. Otherwise, it is deemed to be 
efficient (in the sense of Pareto). Correspondingly, a policy is Pareto improving if it allows 
some agents to see their welfare improved, while losers can be compensated by a 
redistributive scheme. In other words, a Pareto improving policy makes the size of the "pie" 
larger. It is important to note that the Pareto ranking is only partial (by far not a complete 
one), like preferences in the basic consumer model.2 Following the language of decision 
theory, it defines admissible and inadmissible allocations: under quite general assumptions, 
the search for an "optimal" allocation can be reduced to this potentially much reduced set. As 
pointed out above, the incompleteness of many rankings is a pervasive feature in decision 
                                            
1 On the role of admissibility in decision theory, see Berger (1997). 
2 For an example of the incompleteness of Pareto rankings in welfare analysis, see 
Samuelson (1950). 
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theory: relatively uncontroversial rankings must usually be combined with more "subjective" 
-- hence controversial -- criteria in order to produce unique decisions. 
 
Second, a market failure is a situation where the market equilibrium produces a Pareto 
inefficient allocation. Classical examples with respect to perfect competitive equilibrium 
include: monopoly and cartels, externalities -- which may be positive (scientific knowledge) 
or negative (pollution) -- public goods, imperfect information, etc. Such a characterization 
depends crucially on specific features of the model used. For example, what appears to be a 
"market failure" or a "market inefficiency" in the context of a perfect information model 
(where information is free) may vanish once information is represented as a costly 
commodity along with other commodities. 
 
Third, the concept of a Pareto ranking suggests to compare resource allocations A and B by 
checking whether moving from A to B allows the gainers to compensate the losers: if this is 
the case, moving from A to B produces an efficiency gain: the "pie" to be shared has become 
larger. Note that the capacity to pay, not willingness to pay, is what matters here.3 Such 
features can be analyzed without resorting to interpersonal comparisons. Except for the 
assumption that more utility is preferable to less, all the analysis is based on the "scientific" 
techniques of positive economics. The "pie" to be shared has become larger. 
 
Fourth, in efficiency analysis, distribution issues are "bracketed" to focus on aggregate 
wealth. Issues related to production (efficiency) are separated from distribution, a 
methodology which has a long tradition in economics [see, for example, Kaldor (1939) and 
Hicks (1939b)]. Distribution-free normative economics can be viewed as a way of ranking 
economic outcomes under minimal "ethical assumptions", so that issues depend mostly on 
positive economics assumptions and results. This does not mean that distribution (equity, 
inequality) or other ethical considerations are deemed to be unimportant. Many techniques 
used in welfare analysis, such as cost-benefit analysis, are based on such ideas. [For reviews 
of these methods, see Ng (1980) and Just, Hueth and Schmitz (1980).] 
 
The above discussion shows that the notion of market failure is associated in a fundamental 
way with the distinction between efficiency and equity issues. By its very definition, market 
failure analysis involves the identification of situations where more wealth could be created 
while keeping its distribution constant. By construction, it is meant to abstract from 
distributive issues. This entails that "market" failure cannot "justify" redistribution, in the 
sense that policies for correcting market failures do not aim at producing a "desirable" 
income distribution. 
 
                                            
3 Efficiency analysis focuses on income and wealth effects. Income and wealth constitute 
measures of the capacity to consume by its owner, which is quite distinct from the 
willingness to consume or the willingness to pay. 
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4. DISTRIBUTION-SENSITIVE NORMATIVE ECONOMICS 
 
Efficiency analyses are not sufficient for government and political decision making. A final 
assessment usually requires taking into account distribution issues, so the welfare of different 
individuals (groups) must be compared and weighted, and other, "ethical" criteria may 
become relevant, too.4 
 
The notion of a social welfare function [Bergson (1938)] provides a systematic way of doing 
this. Distributional weights can be included in traditional cost-benefit analysis [see 
Harberger (1978)]. Under appropriate assumptions, using such a function leads one to pick a 
unique allocation among the Pareto optimal ones. But this may be too restrictive. Other 
approaches consist in developing criteria for deciding that certain allocations are not 
acceptable from a distribution viewpoint, such as allocations which allow for extreme 
poverty (this leads to policies aimed at satisfying basic needs). 
 
From classical results in social choice theory, we know that aggregating individual 
preferences can be a daunting, if not impossible, exercise. Formulating a social welfare 
function boils down to expressing preferences on the distribution of welfare in relation with 
other values (e.g., individual freedom), possibly on the basis of ethical and religious 
arguments. Differences of opinion on distributional issues depend crucially on attitudes 
towards economic inequality (different aversions to inequality), risk, individual freedom, the 
role of the state, etc. So, not surprisingly, getting different people to agree on some welfare 
function is likely to be highly controversial if not impossible. This may motivate many 
economists to focus on the narrower distribution-free approach. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
Due to the emphasis on efficiency, the problems associated with inequality and redistribution 
may be neglected (although certainly not ignored) in economic research. Economics cannot 
and does not try to have the final say on that. But it can provide useful information on the 
consequences of alternative redistribution policies. Important related issues concern both 
distribution-free and distribution-sensitive analyses. 
 
As a first caveat to the notion that efficiency analysis is "neutral" to redistribution, it is 
important to note that measures that aim at correcting market failures (e.g., taxes, subsidies) 
almost always have distributive effects. Such effects can, however, be cancelled through 
specifically redistributive policies. Furthermore, it is possible to argue that redistribution 
may help increase "social consensus", hence potentially reducing "non-cooperative 
behaviour" such as rebellions or criminality. If such behavior is interpreted as representing a 
negative externality, then this could provide a direct "justification" for redistribution based 
on an efficiency argument. However, in the broader context of distribution-sensitive 
                                            
4  For a general discussion, see Hausman and McPherson (2006). 
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normative economics, such distributive effects can be mediated and cancelled by 
redistribution policies. Indeed, the very idea of "paying" people to refrain from aggression 
may be controversial from an ethical viewpoint. 
 
In our view, a significant limitation of the traditional separation between efficiency and 
distribution problems lies in restrictions on carrying out compensating transfers. In practice, 
transfers are not costless and may be difficult to perform for various reasons (technical, 
political, etc.). A state apparatus with the ability to tax citizens is typically needed to make 
transfers between the members of society, whether such transfers are monetary or in-kind. 
What are the costs (eventually, efficiency costs) of taxation schemes needed to finance 
redistribution? Can a general redistribution scheme (such as a negative income tax, or some 
improvement) fulfill the task of redistributing economic well-being in any desired way? 
 
This raises a more technical question: is it possible to modify traditional efficiency analysis 
to allow for non-neutral redistribution? In principle, nothing precludes one from taking such 
difficulties into account. In particular, this involves the addition of restrictions affecting the 
transfer process to the usual analysis, and second-best techniques may be applied [Lipsey 
and Lancaster (1956)]. These complications have received relatively little attention and may 
be worth further research. 
 
If we agree that efficiency analysis should be completed with the introduction of 
distributional and ethical considerations, this raises other problems. Besides the obvious 
difficulty of achieving agreement on appropriate distributional and ethical criteria, the 
following questions should be raised. (1) What are the most appropriate measures of 
economic inequality: income, wealth, consumption, or something else? Indeed, income, 
wealth and consumption distributions may evolve quite differently [see Krueger and Perri 
(2006)]. (2) What are the actual distributive consequences of alternative policies once all the 
adjustments have taken place (short-run versus long-run effects)? For example, policies that 
may be favorable to the poor in the short-run may have the opposite effect in the long-run. 
(3) The political process which leads to redistribution policies involves a competition 
between political and opinion entrepreneurs (political parties, religious groups, public 
intellectuals, etc.). What are the likely consequences of this process? These issues have been 
extensively studied in public choice theory and point to central difficulties for the design of 
"politically acceptable" social welfare functions [Buchanan (2003)]. 
 
These difficulties underscore the wisdom of separating efficiency and distribution issues in 
the analysis of economic policies, even though this involves limitations. However, both types 
of normative economics matter for the economic policy process. 
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